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How FIFA Used the Principle of Autonomy
of Sport to Shield Corruption in the Sepp
Blatter Era
PROFESSOR J. GORDON HYLTON†

INTRODUCTION
The “corruption crisis” that rocked the world of international
soccer in 2015 raised numerous questions about the motives of the high
ranking officials who have run the Federation Internationale de
Football Association (FIFA) over the past three decades.1 This has
© 2017 Professor J. Gordon Hylton.
†
Professor of Law and History, University of Virginia. Hylton is a graduate of Oberlin College
and the University of Virginia Law School. He also holds a Ph.D. in the history of American
civilization from Harvard University.
1
The
FIFA
Investigation
Explained,
N.Y. TIMES
(Dec.
3,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/04/sports/soccer/fifa-investigation.html?ribbon-adidx=5&rref=sports/soccer&module=ArrowsNav&contentCollection=Soccer&action=swipe
&region=FixedRight&pgtype=article&_r=0; FIFA Corruption Crisis: Key Questions
Answered, BBC NEWS (Dec. 15, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32897066.
FIFA is the international governing body for the sport of soccer/football - consistent with the
practice in the United States, this essay refers to the sport as “soccer,” rather than as “football,”
as the sport is known in most of the world. FIFA sponsors the World Cup, the world’s most
popular sporting event, and oversees the activities of six regional confederations which
together include 211 national organizations, usually referred to as “associations” or
“federations.” FIFA’s mission, according to its webpage, is to “develop football everywhere
and for all, to touch the world through its inspiring tournaments and to build a better future
through the power of the game.” About FIFA, FIFA.COM, http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/index.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2017).
The ultimate policy making agency within FIFA is the Congress, which meets once or twice
each year and is composed of one representative from each member association. Between
sessions of the Congress, the primary decision-making body is the Council (previously known
as the Executive Committee). It consists of the President, eight Vice-Presidents, twenty-four
regular members, and the Secretary General. It also meets twice each year. Matters that must
be resolved when neither the Congress nor the Council are in session, are handled by the
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been especially true in regard to long-time FIFA leader Joseph “Sepp”
Blatter, who served as Secretary-General of the organization from
1981 to 1998 and as President from June of 1998 until October 2015,
when he was removed from office.2 Both Blatter and his predecessor
as president, Brazilian Joao Havelange, have now been implicated in
significant acts of corruption, as had been widely rumored for many
years. 3 One of the signature policies of FIFA during the Blatter era
was the aggressive enforcement of what is usually referred to as the
“non-intervention” or “non-interference” policy. Under this policy, the
national associations that make up FIFA are required to operate
without any “third-party” interference, including governmental
regulation of their decisions.4 This article examines FIFA’s use of the
non-intervention policy during the Blatter era, arguing that in many
Bureau of the Council (previously known as the Emergency Committee) which is composed
of the president and one representative from each of the six regional confederations. The dayto-day operations of FIFA are handled by the President and the Secretary General. See Who
We Are, FIFA.COM, http://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/who-we-are/index.html (last visited Apr.
6, 2017).
2 For basic biographical facts for Blatter see Profile: Sepp Blatter, THE SCOTSMAN (Nov. 20,
2011), http://www.scotsman.com/news/opinion/profile-sepp-blatter-1-1975599.
For the
events surrounding his removal as president of FIFA, see Sam Borden, FIFA President Sepp
Blatter and Other Top Officials Suspended, Deepening FIFA’s Turmoil, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/09/sports/soccer/sepp-blatter-michel-platinijerome-valcke-fifa-suspended.html?_r=0 and The Rise and Fall of Sepp Blatter, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 21, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/05/27/sports/soccer/sepp-blatterfifa-timeline.html?_r=0.
Blatter was banned from any form of participation in FIFA for eight years, but a FIFA appeals
board reduced the penalty to six years. Rachel Axon, Sepp Blatter Loses Appeal of Six Year
FIFA
Ban,
USA
TODAY
(Dec.
5,
2015),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/soccer/2016/12/05/sepp-blatter-fifa-bancas/94989062/. Blatter’s effort to have his ouster over turned by the Court of Arbitration for
Sport was unsuccessful. Sepp Blatter: Former FIFA President's Six-Year Ban Upheld after
Appeal to CAS, BBC SPORT (Dec. 5, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/sport/football/38205918.
3 Havelange served as president of FIFA from 1974 to 1998 and as Honorary FIFA President
until 2013 when he was forced to resign (at age 97) after the FIFA Ethics Committee
determined that he had taken bribes on numerous occasions as FIFA President. Two years
earlier, he had resigned his position on the International Olympic Committee because of a
similar ethics investigation. He died in August 2016, at age 100. Joao Havelange Obituary,
THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 16, 2006), https://www.theguardian.com/football/2016/aug/16/joaohavelange-obituary. For Blatter and rumors of his links to corruption, see supra text
accompanying note 2.
4 The six regional confederations are AFC (Asia), CAF (Africa), CONCACAF (North
America and Caribbean), CONMEBOL (South America), OFC (Oceania) and UEFA
(Europe). FIFA: Who We Are, FIFA.COM, http://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/who-weare/index.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2017). Most national federations represent individual
countries, although a few, like the Faroes Islands, come from areas that are not fully
independent. For historical reasons, England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland each have
a separate association.
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instances the principle was used to protect FIFA rather than improve
public enjoyment of sport.
I. FIFA’S NON-INTERVENTION PRINCIPLE
From the early 1990’s onward, FIFA promptly responded to thirdparty, governmental interventions by suspending or threatening to
suspend the affected national federation until the interference stopped
and any changes brought about by it were reversed.5 Because
suspension meant that the affected federation could not participate in
any international soccer matches, including the popular FIFA World
Cup and the Confederation Cups, few governments have had the will
to stand up to FIFA and risk the political consequences of
disappointing the soccer fans among their constituents.6 On top of that,
a suspended team also lost the opportunity to share in FIFA revenues
which are not insubstantial and have been liberally distributed.7 Over
the past three decades, the popularity of international soccer has
skyrocketed, and as a result FIFA’s coffers have been filled to the brim
with income from live matches, broadcasting contracts, and licensing
deals.8 According to FIFA, over 70% of its annual revenues, which
exceeded $2.1 billion in 2014, are redistributed to the federations
through direct grants and development programs.9 For many smaller
federations, these FIFA transfers constitute a large portion of their
annual revenues. 10
5

For an example of such an action, see Letter from Fatma Samoura, Secretary General, FIFA,
to
the
Members
of
FIFA
(Mar.
17,
2017),
http://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/administration/02/87/68/52/circularno.1
577suspensionofthemalianfootballfederationasof17march2017anduntilfurthernotice_neutral.pdf.
6
FIFA,
FIFA
STATUTES
art.
16
(Apr.
2016),
http://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/generic/02/78/29/07/fifastatutsweben_n
eutral.pdf, 14–15.
7 Peter Berlin, The FIFA Story: Money, Corruption, and Soccer, (Apr. 27, 2016, 11:11 AM),
WORLD POLICY BLOG, http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2016/04/27/fifa-story-moneycorruption-and-soccer.
8
FIFA, FINANCIAL AND GOVERNANCE REPORT 2015 (May 13, 2016),
http://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/administration/02/77/08/71/gb15_fifa_
web_en_neutral.pdf at 16.
9Id.;
FIFA
Expenditure,
FIFA.COM,
http://www.fifa.com/governance/finances/expenditure.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2017).
10 Governance: Finances, FIFA.COM, http://www.fifa.com/governance/finances/ (last visited
Apr. 6, 2017). For FIFA’s revenues in 2014 and earlier, see Isabelle Frazier, FIFA’s Finances
– Where Does All the Money Come From?, THE TELEGRAPH (May 29, 2015),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/fifa/11635985/Fifas-finances-where-does-all-the-
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Given this, suspension from FIFA could have catastrophic
consequences for both the national soccer federation and its country’s
government. Not surprisingly, the public corruption prosecutions
since 2015 have revealed a persistent pattern. FIFA officials from all
levels of the organization are accused of siphoning funds distributed to
the national federations and the confederations, but when national
governments investigating their federations face the prospect of
suspension, the investigation abruptly ends.11 What is just now coming
to light, moreover, is the existence of a set of arrangements in which
Blatter and others in the FIFA leadership maintained their power by
both awarding financial grants to national federations, especially those
located in Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean, and, by overlooking
incidents of mismanagement and corruption.12 In exchange, the
federations who benefitted from this largesse supported Haverlange
and then Blatter in the FIFA Congress and on FIFA committees.13 To
prevent public exposure of this system, the FIFA leadership protected
its supporters by threatening to suspend their federations any time
governmental agents or legislatures got too close to their daily
operations.14Thus, the non-intervention principle became linked to the
protection of a network of corruption inside FIFA itself.15
The effect of this system did not go unnoticed. Although he does
not explore the question of FIFA’s motivation, in his study of the
development of African soccer in the late twentieth century,
money-come-from.html.
See FIFA Corruption Crisis: A Complete List of High-Ranked Officials Who were Banned,
Fined
or
Suspended,
REUTERS
NEWS
SERV.
(Feb.
25,
2016),
https://www.sportskeeda.com/football/fifa-corruption-crisis-complete-list-all-banned-finedsuspended-officials.e
12 For an example of such a grant in the Caribbean see Alex Duff, FIFA Grants Seen Wasted
as Blatter Roadshow Arrives in Caribbean, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Oct. 21, 2013, 6:12 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-10-21/fifa-grants-seen-wasted-as-blatterroadshow-arrives-in-caribbean.
13 Andy Dabilis, Blatter’s FIFA: Growth, Scandals, THE NAT’L HERALD (June 3, 2015)
https://www.thenationalherald.com/87124/blatters-fifa-growth-scandals/.
14 Brian Oliver, Free-for-all and corruption in African football shames Fifa, THE GUARDIAN
(Oct. 24, 2010, 4:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/football/2010/oct/24/corruptionafrican-football-fifa.
15 For an attempt to specifically delineate how this network operated in the final years of
Blatter’s presidency, see Sepp Blatter: How the Machiavellian Master of FIFA Power Politics
2015),
Fell,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Dec.
18,
https://www.theguardian.com/football/2015/dec/21/sepp-blatter-fifa-power-politics.
For
evidence of its success in buttressing the power within FIFA of Blatter and his predecessor,
see TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT: SPORT 157–68 (2016).
11
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Zimbabwean sociologist Manase Kudzai Chiweshe has concluded that
“FIFA’s standing statutes of non-interference have often meant corrupt
leaders [of African sporting organizations] continuing in their
positions for decades,” and that “the major obstacles facing all
countries from combating corruption in football are FIFA’s statutes of
non-interference.”16 Moreover, while there are legitimate arguments
that the sports industry and the public both benefit from the absence of
direct governmental involvement is sport, belief in such a principle
does not really explain the pattern of action by FIFA in the Blatter era.
If FIFA had been truly committed to a principal of national association
autonomy, then it would have attempted to eliminate government
involvement wherever it occurred. However, during Blatter’s years as
president, FIFA voiced no objections to the clearly high level of state
involvement with the national soccer programs in Russia and China
and in the still communist countries like North Korea and Cuba.17
Tellingly, the vast majority of countries that have been threatened with
sanctions for violations of the “non-intervention” principal since the
early 1990’s have been located in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, and
Eastern Europe, where economic resources are less abundant, but also
where the sports/soccer systems are not completely under state control
as they are in North Korea and Cuba.18 Developing nations present
more opportunities for government involvement in sport (as well as
more opportunities for corruption), but they are also much more
susceptible to intimidation by FIFA.19 There is no question that Blatter

16

Manase Kudzai Chiweshe, The Problem with African Football: Corruption and the
(Under)development of the Game on the Continent, AFR. SPORTS L. & BUS. BULL. 27–33 (Feb.
2014) http://www.africansportslawjournal.com/Bulletin_2_2014_Kudzai.pdf.
17
For the involvement of the government in sport in China, see MING LI, ERIC MACINTOSH, &
GONZALO BRAVO, INTERNATIONAL SPORT MANAGEMENT, 199–218 (2011); for Russia,
see OLGA RYMKEVICH, SPORTS LAW IN RUSSIA (2016); for the Democratic Republic of Korea,
see Udo Merkel, The Politics of Sport and Identity in North Korea, in SPORT AND
NATIONALISM IN ASIA: POWER, POLITICS AND IDENTITY 104–118 (Fan Hong & Lu Zhouxiang,
eds., 2015); for Cuba, see Jere Longman, Under Fidel Castro, Sports Symbolized Cuba’s
Strength
and
Vulnerability,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
27,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/27/sports/under-fidel-castro-sport-symbolized-cubasstrength-and-vulnerability.html. In regards to FIFA’s hands-off policy toward Russia, it did
not hurt that Russian President/Prime Minister Vladimir Putin was one of Blatter’s most vocal
supporters. Near the end of Blatter’s career Putin publicly proclaimed that Blatter’s work with
FIFA was worthy of a Nobel Peace Prize. Jethro Mullen, Sepp Blatter Deserves Nobel Prize
for FIFA Work, Russia's Vladimir Putin Says, CNN (July 28, 2015),
http://edition.cnn.com/2015/07/28/football/vladimir-putin-sepp-blatter-fifa-nobel-prize/.
18 Matthew Kenyon, Why Africa Backs Sepp Blatter, BBC NEWS (May 29, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32928984.
19 See id.
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and his predecessor exploited this situation to maintain their positions
of power within FIFA.20
Although FIFA had regularly suspended member associations for
being subject to outside interference for the previous quarter century,
it is somewhat surprising that until 2009, the FIFA Statutes only
indirectly referred to the duty of federations to avoid third-party
interference.21 As late as 2008, references in the FIFA Statutes
consisted only of requirements that the election or appointment of
office-holders be conducted under rules that guarantee “the complete
independence of the election or appointment,” and that they had an
obligation to make decisions independently of any external entity.22
However, in 2009, the FIFA Statutes were revised to make the nature
of this offense much more explicit.23 For example, new Articles 13
and 17, combined with the enforcement implications of Article 14,
clearly identified the prohibition and authorized FIFA to respond
aggressively.24 Article 13.1 listed the obligations of membership which
include the obligation “to manage their affairs independently and
ensure that their own affairs are not influenced by any third-parties,”25
while Article 13.3 authorized sanctions “even if the third-party
influence was not the fault of the Member concerned.”26 Article 17.1
reiterated the same principle: “Each member shall manage its affairs
independently and with no influence from third-parties,” and the
remaining sections of the article elaborate on that point.27 Although
20

See id.
See FIFA, supra note 6, at art. 17.1.
22 See e.g., FIFA Standard Statutes (2004), Art. 10.3(g); FIFA Statutes (2008), Art. 17.1. Also
included was a clause that required member federations to adopt rules prohibiting athletes and
officials from bringing lawsuits against FIFA, the federation, or member clubs in national
courts unless such recourse was specifically permitted by FIFA Statutes. Id. at art. 64.2.
23
See
FIFA,
FIFA
STATUTES
(2009)
https://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/generic/01/24/fifastatuten2009_e.pdf.
24 Id.
25 Id. at art. 13.1(g).
26 Id. at art. 13.3.
27 Id. at Article 17. In its entirety, Article 17 provided:
Independence of Members and their Bodies.
1. Each Member shall manage its affairs independently and with no influence from third
parties.
2. A Member’s bodies shall be either elected or appointed in that Association. A Member’s
statutes shall provide for a procedure that guarantees the complete independence of the
election or appointment.
3. Any Member’s bodies that have not been elected or appointed in compliance with the
provisions of par. 2, even on an interim basis, shall not be recognized by FIFA.
21
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no Article specifically equates “third-parties” with national
governments, FIFA has long insisted that protection of its members
from state influence was one of its primary purposes.28 Additionally,
Article 14.1, while vesting the ultimate authority to expel or suspend
in the FIFA Congress, authorized the Executive Committee to act
immediately to correct a problem, subject only to later review by the
Congress.29 Thus, not only did the FIFA leadership have the authority
under its own rules to intervene in disputes between a federation and
its government, it had the power to act quickly.30 Finally, Article 68.3,
like its predecessor provisions, prohibited lawsuits in national courts.31
Instead, challenges to federation or FIFA actions could be brought only
to FIFA-approved arbitration panels or, in certain cases, to the Court
of Arbitration for Sport in Lausanne, Switzerland.32
The 2009 changes remained in force until 2016, when as part of
the substantial revision of the FIFA Statutes following the 2015
corruption scandal, a new Article 19 was adopted which scaled back
the ability of FIFA to suspend federations because of governmental
violations of the non-intervention policy.33 Under the new provision,
third-party and governmental involvement in the affairs of the soccer
federations are prohibited only when the influence or involvement is
undue.”34 New Article 14 (former Article 13) defining the obligations
of members also specifically limits the requirement of independent
action to the standard defined in Article 19.35
II. HOW FIFA DISCOVERED THE VALUE OF THE NON-INTERVENTION
PRINCIPLE IN THE BLATTER ERA
Preserving their autonomy and avoiding direct regulation by state
and national governments has always been a priority of private
4. Decisions passed by bodies that have not been elected or appointed in compliance with par.
2 shall not be recognized by FIFA.
Id.
28 See infra note 52.
29 FIFA, supra note 23.
30 Id. Provisions for suspension and expulsion of members are contained in FIFA, FIFA
STATUTES (2015), Articles 14 and 15. Article 14.3 specific provides that suspended
federations cannot enjoy any of the benefits of membership. Id.
31 Id. at art. 68.
32 Id.
33 FIFA, FIFA STATUTES (2016), Article 19.
34 Id. The statute does not, however, attempt to define the term “undue.”
35 Id. at article 14.
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sporting institutions, such as FIFA. The self-contained sports leagues
of North America (including the National Football League, the
National Basketball Association, the National Hockey League, and the
various major and minor league baseball leagues), the national sports
federations around the world modeled on Britain’s Football
Association, the international sports federations, and the International
Olympic Committee have all sought to preserve their independence
from state control and to a large extent from state regulation, although
all are happy to receive state subsidies, especially in the form of new
playing facilities.36 However, there is very little evidence that FIFA
was particularly concerned with the issue of strict federation autonomy
between the time of its founding in 1904 and the early 1990’s; so long
as member federations complied with their obligations to the
organization, little attention was paid to the question of state
involvement in sport at the national level.37
Moreover, given the presence of federations in its ranks from
fascist, communist, and totalitarian states during much of its history, it
is difficult to see how FIFA could have demanded a non-interference
boundary between national governments and their soccer federations,
even had it wanted to do so. 38 Only after the fall of the Soviet Union
in 1991 did such an enforcement policy become even credible.39 In
fact, in its early history, a more important concern had to do with FIFA
improperly intervening in the operation of its member federations.40
Such considerations appear to have retarded the early growth of FIFA,

36

The private character of sports organization has been accepted as the norm in the United
States that there is relatively little scholarly writing on the so-called “autonomy principle” in
the United States. For the North America situation generally, see Nathaniel Grow, Regulating
Professional Sports Leagues, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 573 (2015). The subject has received
more attention in Europe. See, e.g., Jean-Loup Chappelet, Autonomy of Sport in Europe
(Council of Europe Publ’g 2010), and the sources cited therein.
37 For the early history of FIFA, see ALAN TOMLINSON, FIFA (FEDERATION INTERNATIONALE
DE FOOTBALL ASSOCIATION): THE MEN, THE MYTHS AND THE MONEY 12-70 (2014).
38 The relationship between totalitarian states and sports is a much studied topic. See, for
example, James Riordan, SPORT IN SOVIET SOCIETY (1977); James Riordan, The Impact of
Communism on Sport, 32 HIST. SOC. RES. 110 (2007); SIMON MARTIN, FOOTBALL AND
FASCISM: THE NATIONAL GAME UNDER MUSSOLINI (2004); DAVID CLAY LARGE, NAZI GAMES:
OLYMPICS OF 1936 (2007); and for the nation state and sport in the 1930’s more generally,
BARBARA J. KEYES, GLOBALIZING SPORT: NATIONAL RIVALRY AND INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY IN THE 1930’S (2006).
39 Fall of the Soviet Union, HISTORYCHANNEL.COM, http://www.history.com/topics/coldwar/fall-of-soviet-union.
40
History of FIFA—Founding, FIFA.COM, http://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/who-weare/history/index.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2017).
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which went from seven members in 1904 to just twenty members in
1920.41 Concern over FIFA interference prompted the four British
Football Associations to withdraw from the organization in 1920, and
while they all rejoined in 1924, all withdrew again in 1928, and did not
return to the ranks of FIFA until after the Second World War.42
Even after the collapse of fascism in the 1970’s and European
Communism in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s the issue of sports
federation autonomy and freedom from government interference did
not really arise within FIFA until the mid-1990’s.43 A study of the
history of state involvement in world soccer published in 1996
assumed what was historically undeniable—FIFA had always looked
the other way in regard to extensive state involvement in the national
football federations.44 Although The Times of London noted in 1987
that FIFA itself was noticeably trying “to resist all outside political
interferences by such organizations as the UN, the EEC, UNESCO and
the Supreme Council for Sport in Africa,” the observation made no
reference to FIFA trying to draw sharp lines between its national
federations and their national governments.45
Suspensions of entire federations, as opposed to individual
players, were also quite rare before the 1990’s; only a handful of such
suspensions were forthcoming between 1960 and 1990.46 For
example, in 1960, the Australian Soccer Football Association was
fined and suspended for violating FIFA player transfer rules which
required a player’s new club to compensate his old one for his

41

Peter J. Beck, British Football and FIFA, 1928-46: Going to War or Peaceful Coexistence?,
18th
Annual
Conference,
(Aug.
19,
1999),
http://www.fifa.com/development/news/y=1999/m=8/news=british-society-sports-history71171.html; see also History of FIFA—Founding, FIFA.COM, http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/who-we-are/history/index.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2017).
42 Beck, supra note 41. Then as now, Great Britain was treated as four countries for purposes
of international soccer competition with associations in England, Scotland, Wales, and Ireland.
Today, both the Irish Republic and Northern Ireland have their own federations.
43
JEAN-LOUP CHAPPELET, AUTONOMY OF SPORT IN EUROPE 7 (Apr. 2010),
http://www.coe.int/t/DG4/EPAS/resources/6720-0-ID8704Autonomy%20of%20sport%20assemble.pdf.
44 VIC DUKE & LIZ CROLLEY, FOOTBALL, NATIONALITY AND THE STATE (1996) (indicating that
state involvement in the affairs of domestic football was close to the norm for world soccer as
late as the 1970’s and early 1980’s).
45 David Miller, Football: United States may be hosts for 1994, THE LONDON TIMES (Mar. 21,
1987).
46 See infra notes 48–54.
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services.47 Three years later, FIFA suspended the Federations of
Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic for non-payment of dues, but
then reinstated them once the payments were forthcoming.48 Later in
the decade, South Africa (1964) and Rhodesia (1970), were both
suspended but only because of their white supremacist racial policies
and not because of any other illegalities in the operation of their
programs.49 More than a decade later in 1981, the United States-based
North American Soccer League faced suspension because of
unauthorized rule changes pertaining to off-sides penalties and in game
substitutions, but rather than challenge the suspension it abandoned the
rule changes.50 In 1986, the Uruguay Football Association was fined
and threatened with suspension because of repeated acts of
“unsportsmanlike behavior on the part of its national team, but it
apparently dropped its controversial activities to avoid a punishment
more severe than censure.”51 Two years later, in April 1988, the
Mexican Federation of Association Football was suspended for two
years for covertly allowing four over-age players to play on its FIFA
youth championship team.52 A more serious episode occurred the
following year when Chile was suspended from both the 1990 and
1994 World Cup competitions because its goaltender faked a serious
injury that required the stoppage of a World Cup qualifying match with
Brazil in which Chile was losing, one to zero.53 None of these actions
involved allegations of improper interference by third-parties,
governmental or otherwise.54
However, in 1992, FIFA began to take a more aggressive
approach and one that involved policing the internal affairs of its

47

Psst
All
Summer,
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD
(Dec.
15,
2013),
http://www.smh.com.au/sport/pssst-all-summer-20131214-2ze3z.html, (citing ROY HAY &
BILL MURRAY, A HISTORY OF FOOTBALL IN AUSTRALIA (2014). Rather than pay the fine, the
ASFA folded, but a revived association was readmitted to FIFA in 1963, following the
payment of the fine. Id.
48 Soccer Leagues Lag in Dues, Suspended, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 1963, at F1.
49 Briefs: Soccer, CHI. TRIB., July 4, 1992, at A3 (reinstatement of South Africa by FIFA);
Football Congress Blasts Rhodesia, CHI. DAILY DEFENDER, June 25, 1979, at 38.
50 FIFA Suspension Faced by NASL, THE TORONTO GLOBE & MAIL, Mar. 4, 1981; NASL Yields
on 2 Rules, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 29, 1981, at C1. One of the traditional goals of FIFA was the
standardization of playing rules across the world.
51
Grahame L. Jones, Uruguayan Team, Fined, Censured, L.A. TIMES, June 15, 1986, at C17.
52 FIFA Lifts Mexican Punishment, XINHUA GEN. OVERSEAS NEWS SERVICE, Nov. 4, 1989. At
the request of other Latin American federations, the punishment was later reduced to one year.
53 FIFA Bans Chile from World Cup for Rojas’s Deceit, THE TIMES, Dec. 9, 1989.
54 See supra notes 48–53.
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federations. In March of that year, it threatened to suspend the
Brazilian Football Federation in a complicated case that directly
involved the family of FIFA president Joao Heverlange.55 This matter
did not involve issues of direct governmental attempts to influence the
federation, but it did involve a soccer team going to court to sue the
federation, which was specifically prohibited by FIFA rules. 56 The
previous July in 1991, Brazilian federation president Ricardo Teixiera,
Haverlange’s son-in-law, had engineered his early re-election.57
Believing that the election had not been proper, the Flamengo soccer
club, the recently crowned champions of Campeonato Brasileriro Serie
A (the top Brazilian league), challenged the legitimacy of Teixiera’s
reelection in a Brazilian court.58 While the Brazilian federation took
no immediate action, FIFA
banned Flamengo from future
competitions.59 Flamengo, undeterred, filed suit against FIFA in a
Swiss court. At that point, FIFA threatened to suspend the Brazilian
federation if it did not take immediate steps to ban Flamengo. 60 In
response, the Brazilian federation did suspend Flemengo, which in turn
withdrew both its lawsuits.61 In the end, Teixiera remained in power
for years to come.62 If nothing else, the Brazilian episode
demonstrated that FIFA could use the threat of suspension to force a
non-cooperating federation, even one in a large, important country like
Brazil, to realign its internal policies with international organization’s
wishes.
Somewhat ironically, later that year FIFA also suspended the
Yugoslavian federation, not for acts of misconduct in the world of
soccer, but because of alleged atrocities committed by Serbia during
the Balkan War.63 Rather than FIFA complaining about governmental
55

Jamie Rainbow, Ricardo Teixeira: how 25 years of absolute power came to an end,
WORLDSOCCER
(Jan
16,
2014),
http://www.worldsoccer.com/columnists/keirradnedge/ricardo-teixeira-how-25-years-of-absolute-power-came-to-an-end-344414.
56 Id.
57 Flamengo banned from international football, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE (Oct. 30, 1991).
58 Id.
59 Id.
60
Hurtful Rifts Give Bucello a Daunting Job, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Mar. 20, 1992)
(discussing the Brazilian situation).
61 Id.
62
Soccer, COURIER MAIL (Brisbane), Mar. 21, 1992 (discussing resolution of Brazilian
situation).
63 Patrick Strickland, Palestinian soccer players tell FIFA Israel violates their ‘basic rights’,
AL
JAZEERA
AM.
(May
20,
2015),
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/5/20/palestinians-campaign-for-israels-
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threat’s to the autonomy of sport, a group of Yugoslav athletes and
sports officials denounced the international soccer authority for
invading the autonomy and independence of sport in Yugoslavia for
what it felt were purely political reasons.64 However, it would be in
nearby Greece that FIFA would first make direct use of the nonintervention rules. In 1993, FIFA was approached by the Greek
Football Federation (EPO) for assistance in its struggle with the Greek
government.65 Although the federation and the government had
traditionally cooperated on sporting matters, a series of match-fixing
incidents in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s prompted the Greek
Parliament to consider legislation that would have given the
government a role in the selection of referees and an ability to make
appointments to the sports disciplinary courts operated by the EPO that
were supposedly dealing with the scandal.66 Such a transfer of power
to the government was emphatically opposed by the Greek
federation.67
Not surprisingly, the EPO, many of whose leaders had been
suspension-from-fifa.html.
64 Yugoslav Athletes Plea to Drop Sports Sanctions, UNITED PRESS INT’L, June 3, 1992,
available at the Lexis News database.
65
The Greek-FIFA conflict of 1993 episode recounted in this and the following two
paragraphs appears to have gone virtually unreported in the English language press. A search
of the news sources in the Lexis News database, the New York Times, the Chicago Tribune,
the Washington Post, and the Los Angeles Times revealed no stories about this conflict. The
facts recounted here and in the following paragraph are taken from the following secondary
sources, which are based on Greek language primary sources: Henk Erik Meier & Borja
Garcia, Protecting Private Transnational Authority against Public Intervention: FIFA’s
Power Over National Governments, 93 PUB. ADMIN. 890 (2015); Borja Garcia & Henk Erik
Meier, Keeping Private Governance Private: Is FIFA Blackmailing National Governments?,
Paper presented at the 8th Sport and EU Annual Conference, Istanbul, Turkey, June 27-28,
2010,
http://www.sportandeu.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Keeping-privategovernance-private_submitted-for-sportandeuconference.pdf; Demitri Panagiotopoulos &
Ioannis Mourniakis. Suspension of Governing Bodies: Analysis, 4 WORLD SPORT L. REP. 8,6
(2006); Demitri Panagiotopoulos & Ioannis Mournianakis, Verbandsautonomie und staatliche
Regulierung – Der Konflikt zwischen FIFA und Griechischem Fußballbund [Autonomy and
state regulation - The conflict between the Greek Football Federation and FIFA], SPORT UND
RECHT [SPORT & THE L.] 190–92 (2006).
66 Ian Ross, Swansea Dismiss Manager, THE TIMES, Mar. 6, 1990 (reporting a number of
different stories including one about the Greek match-fixing scandal). Ironically, the events
that triggered the 1993 clash started in March 1990, when Greek referee Constantin
Dimitriadis reported to FIFA Secretary-General Sepp Blatter that he had evidence of attempted
bribery and match fixing at the highest levels of Greek football.
67 For background see Christos Anagnostopoulos, The Battlefield of Greek Football:
Organizing Top-Tier Football in Greece, in ORGANISATION AND GOVERNANCE OF TOP
FOOTBALL ACROSS EUROPE: AN INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 209–23, especially 209–13
(Hallgeir Gammelsaeter & Benoit Senaux, eds., 2011).
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rumored to be involved in the alleged wrongdoing, opposed the
proposed legislation. When it became clear that the legislation would
likely pass, the EPO leaders contacted FIFA directly and requested that
it “suspend” the EPO from future competitions in order to put pressure
on the Greek government to abandon the proposed changes.68 As
requested, FIFA threatened to suspend the EPO if the proposed statute
went into effect, a decision which would have prevented Greece from
participating in international matches, including the 1994 World
Cup.69 Although Greece had traditionally been one of the doormats of
European soccer, the Greek national team playing in the 1993
preliminaries was quite strong, and by early May, it had qualified for
the World Cup’s final round for the first time ever.70 A suspension
would have dashed the hopes of Greek soccer fans, and fearing the
possibility of a popular reprisal, the Greek government withdrew the
proposed legislation.71
Less successful was an effort later the same year in which FIFA
attempted to reverse a decision of the Paraguayan government to
cancel the final four weeks of its premier professional soccer league’s
1993-94 season. Citing endless corruption and violence at games,
Paraguay announced in December that the remaining games of the
Paraguayan Football League were being cancelled.72 It also instructed
the directors of the league to elect a 1993 champion to represent the
country in the following year’s Copa Libertadores, the annual Latina
American professional championship.73 Terminating a league season
early was contrary to FIFA guidelines, and the FIFA Executive
Committee announced that it would protest the decision and would
undertake an investigation of the matter.74 In this case, there is no
68 In the future, embattled association officials, such as EPO, seeking support from FIFA
would become a predictable feature of FIFA clashes with national governments.
69

See Anagnostopoulos, supra note 67.
See Phil Hersh, 3 European Doormats Rise Up for Finals, CHI. TRIB., May 8, 1993, at A6.
71 For the withdrawal of the legislation, see supra note 67. The Greek team travelled to the
United States for the 1994 World Cup, but there it was quickly eliminated by three consecutive
losses to Argentina, Bulgaria, and Nigeria. The Greek team went scoreless in all three games.
See
FIFA,
1994
FIFA
World
Cup
USA,
FIFA.COM,
http://www.fifa.com/worldcup/archive/usa1994/groups/index.html.
70

72

Vote decides Paraguay Title, THE INDEP. (Dec. 31, 1993).
The Copa Libertadores was a competition of independent professional teams. Bienvenidos
a la Copa Libertadores 2017, COPALIBERTADORES.COM, http://www.copalibertadores.com/
(last visited May 14, 2017).

73

74

Vote Decides Paraguay Title, supra note 72; Paraguay Elect Champions, IRISH TIMES, Dec.
31, 1993; Ian Broadly, Ajax Back Their Loyal Fans, THE HERALD, Jan. 17, 1994 (discussing
the FIFA investigation’s lack of impact).
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evidence that FIFA’s intervention in any way altered the decision of
the Paraguayan government.75 Of course, unlike the case in Greece
earlier in the year, FIFA had not threatened to suspend the Paraguayan
Football Federation, probably because of government’s intervention
applied only to the internal operation of the country’s top professional
league, and thus did not directly affect FIFA’s primary area of
operation. In any event, by mid-January it was clear that the FIFA
investigation was going to have little effect.76
The following year, FIFA did apply the Greek approach in a
situation involving African soccer power Cameroon. On March 30,
1994, shortly before the Cameroonian national team, known as the
“Indomitable Lions,” left for the United States and the 2014 World
Cup, the Cameroon Football Federation’s (FECAFOOT) central
committee fired its president, Pascal Owona.77 Owona was accused by
his colleagues of mismanagement, and the federation’s General
Secretary Maha Daher was elevated to the presidential post.78
However, Cameroonian Prime Minister Simon Achidi Achu,
apparently at the behest of President Paul Biva, vetoed the dismissal of
Owona and ordered Minister of Sports Bernard Massou II to remove
all members of the central committee responsible for Owona’s
discharge.79 However, on April 3, before Massou could act, FIFA
Secretary General Blatter informed FECAFOOT that it recognized
Daher, not Owona, as the head of the Cameroonian organization.80 In
addition, he stated that if the government of Cameroon persisted in its
efforts on behalf of Owona, FIFA would have no choice but to suspend
the Lions from all FIFA activities, including the 1994 World Cup.81
Blatter also let it be known that FIFA was prepared to substitute the
75

Vote decides Paraguay title, supra note 72.
See generally, Ian Broadley, Ajax back their loyal fans, THE HERALD, Jan. 17, 1994, at 6.
The Scottish journalist did not appear to take FIFA’s investigation very seriously, observing,
“FIFA has launched an inquiry but that will solve little where football has now gone out of
bounds once too often.” Id.
77 Etienne Tasse, Cameroon-Sport/Politics: Scoring Government Goals With Football, INTER
PRESS SERV. (Mar. 15, 1995), http://www.ipsnews.net/1995/03/cameroon-sport-politicsscoring-government-goals-with-football/.
78
This account is based upon the following sources: Id.; Christopher Clarey, World Cup ’94;
Cameroon Tries to Raise a Dream While All Else is Collapsing, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 1994),
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/05/15/sports/world-cup-94-cameroon-tries-to-raise-a-dreamwhile-all-else-is-collapsing.html?pagewanted=all.
79 Cameroon-Sport: Indomitable Lions Face World Cup Disqualification, IPS-INTER PRESS
SERV., May 7, 1994.
80 FIFA drops threat against Cameroon, Xinhua News Agency, May 7, 1994.
81 Id.
76
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national team of Zimbabwe, a team that Cameroon had earlier
eliminated, in upcoming World Cup play.82
Rather than risk what the Inter Press Service described as “a
potentially disastrous eventuality,” Prime Minister Achu and President
Paul Biya backed down and acknowledged the election of Daher.83
Moreover, before the FIFA intervention, Biya had apparently planned
to turn Cameroonian soccer over to a newly created government body
established by presidential decree the previous year, but Blatter’s
warning seems to have led to Biya abandoning that plan.84 As it had
done the year before with Greece, FIFA forced a change in a
government plans by threatening to deny the country the opportunity
to participate in international soccer.85
Two additional cases in 1996 confirmed that FIFA had adopted a
new policy in regard to internal intervention. In Algeria, the
government took admittedly extreme steps to express its outrage at the
recent failures of it national team. After making the World Cup finals
in 1982 and 1986, the Algerian national team stumbled during the next
two World Cup cycles, and when it was eliminated from the 1998
World Cup by Kenya in June of 1996, Algeria’s Minister of Youth and
Sport, former national team player Mouldi Aisaoui, decided to revamp
the country’s international program.86 Not only did he dissolve the
Algerian Football Federation (FAF), he also suspended all of the FAF
senior officials for five years.87 For good measure, he also fired Ali
Fergani, the national team’s coach, and forbade him for working in
Algerian soccer for the remainder of his life.88 Apparently Aisaoui
intended for the Ministry of Sport to take over the role of the
federation, a position that was unacceptable to FIFA, especially at a
time when most of the government-run soccer federations in former

82

See generally id.
Etienne Tasse, Cameroon-Sport/Politics: Scoring Government Goals With Football, INTER
PRESS SERV. (Mar. 15, 1995), http://www.ipsnews.net/1995/03/cameroon-sport-politicsscoring-government-goals-with-football/.
84 See id.
85
Id.
86
For the elimination by Kenya, see Algeria national football team ‘A’ international record:
1996, 11V11, http://www.11v11.com/teams/algeria/tab/matches/season/1996/ (last visited
April 5, 2017).
87 Algerian football body to be reinstated to beat FIFA sanctions, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR
(Aug. 28, 1996).
88 Id.
83
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communist countries had been freed from state control.89 Rather that
recognize the Ministry’s control of Algerian soccer, FIFA ordered
Algeria to hold elections for a new FAF by the end of August or risk
suspension.90 Although Algeria, unlike Greece and Cameroon, would
not have lost a World Cup slot had it persisted in its resistance to FIFA,
it also had no desire to be cast in the role of an international soccer
“outlaw,” especially as it tried to rebuild its once vaunted national
team.91 Consequently, the government abandoned its plans to take over
Algerian soccer and instead scheduled new federation elections prior
to the date ordered by FIFA.92
Another opportunity for FIFA to threaten a national government
came in late November 1996, when the Albanian Secretary of State for
Education and Sport, Marjeta Pronjari-Zace, abruptly removed Eduard
Dervishi, the secretary general of the Albanian Football Federation
(AFF), from office, and dissolved the AFF’s executive committee.93
Although the act may have been politically motivated - the Secretary
and Dervishi were members of different political parties - PronjariZace claimed that her action was in response to Dervishi’s
incompetence and his failure to hold a scheduled election for a new
executive council.94 However, the delayed election cited by PronjariZace had already been the subject of negotiations between FIFA, the
European Football Association (UEFA), the Albanian Football
Association and the Albanian government, and an agreement to delay
the election had been reached on October 29, reportedly with the
consent of all, including Pronjari-Zace.95
FIFA responded to Pronjari-Zace’s actions on November 27,
1996, by banning Albania indefinitely from World Cup play, even
though it was in the middle of the preliminary rounds for the 1998
World Cup and was only a little more than two weeks away from a
scheduled qualifying match with Northern Ireland.96 Asserting that it
89

Id.
Id.
91 See generally id.
92
Algerian football body to be reinstated to beat FIFA sanctions, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR
(Aug. 28, 1996).
93 Alex Standish, Albania hauled into line, THE EUROPEAN (Dec. 5, 1996).
94
Id.
95
FIFA Suspends Albania, ASSOCIATED PRESS INT’L (Nov. 27, 1996).
96
FIFA Suspends Football Association of Albania, FIFA (Nov. 27 1996),
http://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/news/y=1996/m=11/news=fifa-suspends-footballassociation-albania-70146.html.
90
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“considered that these decisions violated FIFA’s statutory provisions
as well as the agreement proposed by a FIFA/UEFA delegation and
agreed upon by State Secretary for Sports, Marjeta [Pronjari-]Zace, in
Tirana on October 29,” FIFA removed Albania from the FIFA
Congress and imposed a December 7, 1996, deadline for the
reappointment of Dervishi and the members of the executive council.97
FIFA also noted that failure to meet the ten-day deadline could mean
that Albania would be barred from participating in both the 1998 and
2002 World Cup competitions, regardless of what steps it might
subsequently take.98
Even though Pronjari-Zace and her colleagues at the sports
ministry appeared ready to resist the FIFA threats, other members of
the Albanian government reacted differently.99 As had been the case
with Greece, Cameroon, and Algeria, the prospect of a disappointed
public led the Albanian government to accept the FIFA demands, and
as early as November 29 (just two days after FIFA’s ultimatum),
newspapers were reporting that Albania planned to do what was
necessary to return to FIFA’s good graces.100 The following day, the
Albanian Council of Ministers announced that the dismissals of
Dervishi and the members of the executive council would be vacated,
and all would immediately be returned to their old positions.101 In
addition, Albanian Prime Minister Aleksander Meksi offered a number
of public pronouncements affirming his country’s desire to play a role
in international soccer and to comply with the FIFA statutes.102 On
December 4, the Albanian Football Federation was officially reinstated
as a member of FIFA, and on December 14, the national team played
its scheduled game against Northern Ireland (which it lost, two to
zero).103 FIFA officials were apparently so confident at this point that
Albania would capitulate following its ultimatum that FIFA told the
director of the Irish Football Association, the federation for Northern
The quote from the FIFA communique is from Football, AGENCE FR. PRESSE – ENG. (Nov.
27, 1996).
98 Albania banned from international football competition, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR (Nov.
27, 1996).
99 FIFA ban a grave blow to Albanian football, official says, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR
(Nov. 28, 1996).
100 See Peter Byrne, Quinn’s recovery from knee surgery ahead of schedule, THE IRISH TIMES
(Nov. 29, 1996).
101 Albanian government withdraws sacking of football officials, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR
(Nov. 30, 1996).
102 Raymond Travers, Dowie puts Albanians in their place, SCOT. ON SUNDAY (Dec. 15, 1996).
103 “Albania back in, DAILY TELEGRAPH (Dec. 4, 1996).
97

6_FINAL_HYLTON (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

FIFA USED PRINCIPLE OF AUTONOMY OF SPORT

11/6/2017 2:14 PM

151

Ireland which was hosting the game, that it should not worry about
having to cancel the game and should instead, “carry on as normal.”
104

The episodes involving Greece, Cameroon, Algeria, and Albania,
all economically weak, vulnerable nations, established that FIFA
leadership could “blackmail” certain countries when it believed that
government action was contrary to its interests. Beginning in 1997,
the power was exercised with increased frequency, and by 2000, the
number of cases in which FIFA had intervened on behalf of member
associations facing some element of loss of control to government
agencies had increased from four to thirteen, as additional actions were
initiated against Namibia, Poland, Zambia, Hungary, Cameroon
(again), Benin, Guinea, Tanzania, and Brazil.105 In every case but one,
Guinea, where the suspension lasted two year, the challenged
government quickly complied with FIFA’s demands.106
By 2000, the legitimacy of FIFA’s aggressive enforcement of the
non-intervention policy also seemed to have been widely accepted by
the sporting public. In an August 2000 story reporting that the Sierra
Leone legislature had called the Secretary General of the Sierra Leone
Football Association to appear before it to explain the national team’s
poor performance in recent games against Nigeria and Ghana, the
Africa News observed, “[i]t is unusual for football association officials
to face parliament because the World Governing Body, FIFA, is
against political interference in soccer.”107 Although the practice of
aggressively enforcing the non-intervention policy was less than a
Alex Toner, It’s On!; Northern Ireland Given All Clear to Play Albania in Belfast, DAILY
MIRROR (Dec. 4, 1996).
105 Conrad Argula, FIFA Threatens to Suspend Namibia, AFR. NEWS (June 26, 1998)
(Namibia); Dominic O’Reilly, Power Struggle Brings World Ban, THE EUR. (Aug. 3, 1998)
(Poland); Alfred Mulula Lusaka, Football Dispute May Lead to Suspension, IPS-INTER PRESS
SERV. (Sept. 4, 1998) (Zambia); Greenland Presses for Recognition Around the World, THE
INDEP. (Sept. 28, 1999) (Hungary); Soccer Sunday, AFR. NEWS(Jan. 10, 1999) (Cameroon);
Poland’s New Soccer President Calls for Reforms, ASSOC. PRESS INT’L, (June 29, 1999)
(Poland); Norbert N. Ouendji, Joseph-Antoine Bell Denounces FIFA’s Interference, AFR.
NEWS (Oct. 29, 1999) (Cameroon); Cameroon Suspended Indefinitely by FIFA, AFR. NEWS
(Dec. 25, 1999) (Cameroon); FIFA Ban on Benin Lifted, AGENCE FR. PRESSE – ENG. (Apr. 1,
2000) (Benin); FIFA and Tanzania on Collision Course, AGENCE FR. PRESSE – ENG.
(Tanzania); Fajah Barrie, Sierra Leone: Alimu Bah faces Parliament Monday, AFR. NEWS
(Aug. 11, 2000) (Sierra Leone); Brazil Could Face World Cup Ban, THE SCOTSMAN (Oct. 30,
2000) (Brazil); Brazil Faces World Cup Ban, SHANGHAI STAR (Oct. 31, 2000) (Brazil).
106 See supra note 105.
107 Fajah Barrie, Sierra Leone; Alimu Bah faces Parliament Monday, Afr. News (Aug. 11,
2000).
104
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decade old, it had clearly become part of the culture of international
soccer and there is very little evidence of criticism of FIFA for taking
this step.
It was also clear by 2000 that the merits of the concerns that had
prompted a government to intervene in soccer matters were irrelevant
to FIFA. The official position was that governmental removal of a
corrupt federation official outside of the rules of the federation was just
as much a threat to the autonomy of soccer as the removal on purely
political grounds of an official who had acted honestly and in the
public interest. The same month that the above mentioned story
appeared in the Africa News, Blatter warned the Brazilian legislature
that if it continued with its announced investigation into corruption in
soccer in Brazil, it risked the possibility of a suspension from
international play, regardless of what the investigation revealed.108 As
Slovenian sports law scholar Tine Misic later observed, in the years of
Blatter’s involvement with FIFA the organization “developed a zerotolerance policy for any governmental interference regarding the
affairs of its Members, thus arguably safeguarding their
independence.”109
Why Blatter’s assertion of private power at the expense of public
interest did not produce greater criticism in the 1990’s and early 2000’s
is a puzzling question. Fortunately, for FIFA, the organization’s
assertion of the non-intervention principle in the 1990’s came
simultaneously with an important public debate concerning the proper
role of sport within the governance structure of the European Union.
The dominant view in that debate was that sport in a democratic society
should be allowed to operate under private rather than governmental
control.110 This view was embraced in a number of European Union
documents adopted at the end of the twentieth century. For example,
the Treaty of Amsterdam’s 1997 Declaration on Sport emphasized the
social significance of sport but said little about the need for
governmental regulation.111 Moreover, the Helsinki Report on Sport,
108

Brazil Faces World Cup Ban, SHANGHAI STAR (Oct. 31, 2000).
Tine Misic, Policing the (in)dependence of National Federations through the Prism of
FIFA
Statutes,
ASSER
INT’L
SPORTS
L.
BLOG
(July
10,
2015),
http://www.asser.nl/SportsLaw/Blog/post/policing-the-in-dependence-of-nationalfederations-through-the-prism-of-the-fifa-statutes-by-tine-misic.
109

110

The collapse of the socialist model of sport in the decade was undoubtedly an important
development influencing this line of thought. See, e.g., supra note 17 and accompanying
text.
111

Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing
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drafted for the European Commission in 1999, was prepared “with a
view to safeguarding current sports structures and maintaining the
social function of sport within the Community framework.”112 The
Helsinki Report on Sport also emphasized the importance of the
principle of subsidiarity (local control) and the autonomy of sporting
organizations.113 Although the Nice Declaration of Sport (2000)
recognized that the responsibility for administering sport was to be
divided between sporting organizations and nation states, it also
recognized that it was the task of the sports federations to organize,
promote, and police their particular sports.114 Consequently, FIFA’s
aggressive embrace of the non-intervention principle in the 1990’s
probably seemed consonant with the general movement toward the
embrace of the idea that autonomy of the private sports industry was
generaly a good idea.115
After 2000, FIFA became, if anything, even more openly
committed to the non-interference principle. A study of FIFA
disciplinary actions between 2003 and 2013 by sports policy scholars
Henk Erik Meier and Borja Garcia reports that in that eleven year
period, FIFA issued twenty-four suspensions for improper
governmental involvements, and in six other cases it would have
suspended the national federation had the governments not quickly
dropped their “objectionable” actions.116 Only one suspension, Brunei,
lasted more than one year, and a substantial majority lasted less than
two months, presumably because the “problem” was quickly
corrected.117 Even where no formal action was taken, one could see
the impact of FIFA’s policies. In 2011, in spite of a warning from
FIFA, Venezuela adopted a new Law of Sport sponsored by President
the European Communities and Certain Related Acts art. 29, Oct. 2, 1997, 11997D OJC 340.
112 REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL: THE HELSINKI REPORT ON
SPORT, COMM’N OF THE EUR. COMMUNITIES (Oct. 12, 1999).
113 Id. at § 4.2.
114
EUR. COUNCIL, CONCLUSIONS OF THE PRESIDENT: ANNEX IV – DECLARATION ON THE
SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS OF SPORT AND ITS SOCIAL FUNCTION IN EUROPE, OF WHICH
ACCOUNT SHOULD BE TAKEN IN IMPLEMENTING COMMON POLICIES (2000).
115 Robert Siekman, The Specificity of Sport: Sporting Exceptions in EU Law, ASSER INT’L
SPORTS
L.
CTR.
(2012),
http://www.pravst.unist.hr/dokumenti/zbornik/2012106/zb201204_697.pdf. For the larger
question of whether the sports industry is entitled to a certain level of autonomy and freedom
from government regulation. See, e.g., JEAN-LOUP CHAPPELET, AUTONOMY OF SPORT IN
EUROPE 11–12 (Council of Eur. Pub. 2010) (discussing the history of the embrace of autonomy
principles by the International Olympic Committee).
116 Meier & Garcia, supra note 65, at 895-97.
117 Id. at 896–897.
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Hugo Chavez that created a Sports Justice Commission with the
statutory authority to hear complaints against the Venezuelan Football
Federation (VFF) and other sporting organizations in ways that clearly
would violate the FIFA Statutes.118 Although Venezuela refused to
modify its statute in face of FIFA’s threats to suspend the VFF if the
law passed, to date the law has not been invoked against the VFF, and
there has been no evidence of state efforts to control the national
federation.119
Furthermore, beginning in 2000, FIFA adopted a policy of
requiring federations in nations that had violated the non-intervention
policy to accept FIFA-appointed “normalization committees” who
would run the country’s soccer program until FIFA determined that it
was “safe” for the national football association to retake control of the
sport.120 In 2004, FIFA announced publically that it was stepping up
“vigilance against government interference” and that its Associations
Committee would devote special efforts to enforcing the antiintervention rules.121 In a September 27, 2004, media announcement,
FIFA specifically named thirteen counties that gave the committee
cause for concern.122 The next year, a FIFA task force was charged
with investigating a number of contemporary problems, including the
problem of government interference. 123 At the same time, FIFA also
formally requested that countries with laws inconsistent with
federation control of the sport of soccer - specifically Poland, Greece,
118

Diego Ore, Soccer-Venezuela courts controversy with sports law, REUTERS (Aug 2, 2011),
http://www.reuters.com/article/soccer-latam-venezuela-fifa-idUSLDE77200220110803.
119
Pitching in, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 17, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/21550302
(discussing the impact of the new Sports Law, no mention is made of its application to
soccer or the VFF).
120

Salaam, FIFA suspends Tanzania, AGENCE FR. PRESSE (Oct. 27, 2000). The
appointment of a normalisation committee is currently authorized for “exceptional
circumstances.” FIFA, supra note 6, at art. 7.2.
121 FIFA steps up vigilance against government interference, FIFA (Sep. 27, 2004),
http://www.fifa.com/live-scores/news/y=2004/m=9/news=fifa-steps-vigilance-againstgovernment-interference-94282.html.
122

Id. The thirteen country federations were, in the order of mention, Greece, Niger, Ethiopia,
Gabon, Guatemala, Malawi, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Barbuda, Burundi, Iraq, Kenya, and Puerto
Rico. Id.
123

See generally, FIFA Task Force to tackle current football problems, FIFA MEDIA
RELEASE (Sep. 10, 2005), http://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/news/y=2005/m=9/news=fifatask-force-tackle-current-football-problems-100056.html. The provisions authorizing the
appointment of a normalization committee required consultation with the appropriate
confederation and were inserted in the FIFA Statutes as Article 7.2. The provision was
retained in the 2016 revision of the statutes as Article 8.2. FIFA, supra note 6, at art. 8.2.

6_FINAL_HYLTON (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

FIFA USED PRINCIPLE OF AUTONOMY OF SPORT

11/6/2017 2:14 PM

155

and Portugal - replace those laws by the middle of July 2006.124 In
2008, another media release announced that the Associations
Committee was continuing to actively monitor federation-government
interactions.125 Also, as mentioned previously, the FIFA Statutes were
rewritten at the end of the decade to more clearly state that
independence from government influence was a mandatory
requirement for FIFA members.126
In 2014 and 2015, the final two years of Blatter’s tenure, FIFA
suspended or threatened to suspend the soccer federations of Gambia
(2014), Nigeria (2014), the Maldives (2014), Indonesia (2015), Kuwait
(2015), Guatemala (2015), and Indonesia (2015).127 In three of these
cases (Gambia, Maldives, and Guatemala) the investigated country
was required to accept a normalisation committee, and in Guatemala
the term of its normalisation committee was extended into a second
year.128 All of the listed federations were suspended or threatened with
suspension exclusively because of governmental interference, except
124

FIFA Task Force to tackle current football problems, supra note 123.
See generally, Strong deference of the independence of football associations, FIFA MEDIA
RELEASE (Feb. 06, 2008), http://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/news/y=2008/m=2/news=strongdefence-the-independence-football-associations-685487.html.
126 It was at this time that Articles 13, 14, and 17, were enacted in their expanded form. See
FIFA, supra note 23.
127
Normalisation Committee appointed for Gambia Football Federation, FIFA.COM (July 10,
2014), http://www.fifa.com/governance/news/y=2014/m=7/news=normalisation-committeeappointed-for-gambia-football-federation-2403244.html; FIFA Emergency Committee sets 8
September
deadline
for
NFF,
FIFA.COM
(Sept.
03,
2014),
http://www.fifa.com/governance/news/y=2014/m=9/news=fifa-emergency-committee-sets8-september-deadline-for-nff-2435742.html; Suspension of the Kuwait Football Association,
FIFA.COM
(Oct.
16,
2015),
http://www.fifa.com/governance/news/y=2015/m=10/news=suspension-of-the-kuwaitfootball-association-2717726.html; Suspension of the Guatemala Football Association, FIFA
MEDIA
RELEASE
(Oct.
28,
2016),
http://www.fifa.com/governance/news/y=2016/m=10/news=suspension-of-the-guatemalafootball-association-2847078.html; Normalisation committee appointed for the Football
Association
of
Maldives,
FIFA.COM
(Dec.
02,
2014),
http://www.fifa.com/governance/news/y=2014/m=12/news=normalisation-committeeappointed-for-the-football-association-of-mald-2486998.html; Indonesia disqualified from
2018 FIFA World Cup Russia and AFC Asian Cup 2019 qualifies, FIFA.COM (June 03, 2015),
http://www.fifa.com/worldcup/news/y=2015/m=6/news=indonesia-disqualified-from-2018fifa-world-cup-russia-and-afc-asian-c-2617809.html; Fifa ends Indonesia’s suspension from
football
after
almost
a
year,
BBC
(May
14,
2016),
http://www.bbc.com/sport/football/36292992; FIFA Fails to Lift Kuwait Suspension –
Al-Maayouf Faults
Personal
Agendas, ARAB TIMES
(May 14, 2016),
http://www.arabtimesonline.com/news/fifa-fails-lift-kuwait-suspension-al-maayouf-faultspolitics-personal-agendas/.
128 See supra note 127.
125
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for Gambia, which was also accused of using overage players in
international youth competitions.129
In every case, but that of Kuwait and Guatemala, the national
government accused of third-party interference acknowledged the
legitimacy of new Articles 13 and 17 and terminated the complained
of intervention.130 In most cases, the capitulation was quite quick.
Guatemala also initially capitulated, accepting a normalisation
committee in December 2015.131 However, when FIFA decided to
extend the committee for another ten months in September 2016,
because of the alleged failure to cooperate on the part of Guatemalan
officials, Guatemala balked, and FIFA formally suspended the
Guatemalan Football Federation.132 Additionally, when the Kuwaiti
government refused to cooperate with FIFA the Kuwaiti Football
Association was indefinitely suspended.133
Throughout Blatter’s tenure, federations subject to FIFA-imposed
sanctions had the right under the FIFA Statutes to challenge these
penalties in the Court of Arbitration for Sport in Lausanne,
Switzerland.134 However, FIFA’s tactics were so effective that no
federation did so until 2014, when an ousted president of the Nigerian
Football Federation (NFF) challenged the legality of FIFA’s
conduct.135 At the beginning of July, 2014, shortly after the
elimination of Nigeria by France in that year’s World Cup, the
leadership of the NFF was enjoined by a Nigerian court from
continuing to operate the federation.136 In addition, a government
representative was appointed to manage the federation’s affairs until
the court had time to rule on the legality of past actions by the previous

129

Normalisation Committee appointed for Gambia Football Federation, supra note 127.
See supra note 127.
131
Suspension of the Guatemala Football Association, FIFA MEDIA RELEASE (Oct. 28, 2016),
http://www.fifa.com/governance/news/y=2016/m=10/news=suspension-of-the-guatemalafootball-association-2847078.html.

130

132

Id.
Football Shorts, SUN. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2016). According to the Times, FIFA also
contemplated filing a lawsuit against Kuwait, although where and what grounds was
not revealed. Id. As of March 1, 2017, Guatemala and Kuwait remain on the FIFA suspended
list.
133

134

FIFA, FIFA DISCIPLINARY CODE (2017).
Samm Audu, CAS Reject Giwa Group Appeal to Restrain FIFA, AFRICAN FOOTBALL (Sept.
10,
2014),
http://africanfootball.com/news/457517/CAS-reject-Giwa-group-appeal-torestrain-FIFA.
135

136

Nigerian Football Federation v. FIFA, CAS 2014/A/3744.
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NFF leadership.137 Citing improper governmental intervention, FIFA
suspended the NFF on July 9, and, true to form, the Nigerian
government capitulated and restored to office the old leadership on
July 16.138 Then, on August 26, 2014, an election for president of the
NFF was won by a professional soccer club owner named Chris
Giwa.139 Believing Giwa’s election to be the result of continuing
improper influence on the part of the Nigerian government FIFA again
threatened to suspend the NFF from international play, unless another
election was held.140 The NFF again capitulated, and another election
was held the following month, this time resulting in the election of a
candidate acceptable to FIFA.141
At this point, Giwa filed a suit against FIFA in the CAS, claiming
to be the actual president of the NFF.142 On May 15, 2015, in the case
of Nigerian Football Federation v. FIFA,143 a three-man, all European
arbitral panel accepted the legitimacy of the FIFA non-intervention
rules and the way in which they were used to limit governmental
involvement with soccer federations. Although the panel emphasized
the very narrow scope of its ruling, holding only that FIFA had
correctly applied its own rule in refusing to accept Giwa’s election in
2014, the fact was that FIFA had again prevailed.144 If there had been
any concern that the CAS panel might pry into the ways in which FIFA
applied the non-intervention principle, those concerns proved
unfounded. Ironically, this “vindication” of Blatter’s policies by the
CAS arbitrators came just twelve days before seven FIFA officials
were arrested on corruption charges in Zurich, Switzerland.145 The
Zurich arrests set in motion a set of events that quickly culminated in
Blatter’s suspension from the FIFA presidency on October 8, 2015,
137

Id at 3.
Id at 4.
139 Id at 7–8.
140 Id at 20.
141 Id.
142
FIFA Emergency Committee suspends Nigeria Football Federation, FIFA.COM (July 9,
2014),
http://www.fifa.com/governance/news/y=2014/m=7/news=keep-pending-fifaemergency-committee-suspends-nigeria-football-federa-2402265.html; Nigeria’s Ban from
FIFA Lifted after the Reinstatement of Officials, GUARDIAN (July 18, 2014),
https://www.theguardian.com/football/2014/jul/18/nigeria-reinstated-fifa-ban.
143
Nigerian Football Federation v. FIFA, CAS 2014/A/3744.
144 Id.
145
FIFA Officials Arrested on Corruption Charges as World Cup Inquiry Launched,
GUARDIAN (May 27, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/football/2015/may/27/several-topfifa-officials-arrested.
138
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less than five months after the CAS decision.146
CONCLUSION
Whether or not the departure of Blatter and several of his
colleagues from the upper ranks of the FIFA leadership marks an end
to the era of FIFA interventions into national federation affairs remains
to be seen.147 In all likelihood, it will continue in some form, as not
every application of the non-intervention principle by FIFA since the
early 1990’s was simply a matter of Blatter and his allies trying to
protect a crony from prosecution or removal from office. Future
investigations will identify which of the more than fifty interventions
during Blatter’s presidency were based on legitimate concerns. No
doubt, there may be some circumstances in which governmental
intervention into the internal affairs of a national soccer federation may
be unjustified. In fact, governmental conduct that is completely
arbitrary or corrupt should be resisted by private sports organizations.
However, if the non-intervention principle is retained, it should be held
in reserve for such cases, where, to use the language of new Article 19,
the intervention is “undue” or completely unreasonable.148
During the Havelange-Blatter era, FIFA officials clearly used the
non-intervention principle to provide a prophylactic shield around its
internal affairs. One can hope that in the future the new FIFA
leadership will be less trigger-happy in imposing suspensions and
normalization committees, especially in cases were the goal of

146

Sam Borden, FIFA President Sepp Blatter and Other Top Officials Suspended, Deepening
FIFA’s
Turmoil,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
8,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/09/sports/soccer/sepp-blatter-michel-platini-jeromevalcke-fifa-suspended.html?_r=0.
147 There are already some indications that it may not. After Blatter’s resignation, the
suspension of Indonesia, which involved the institution of a financial solvency based-licensing
requirement for professional teams, was not revoked until Indonesia abandoned the
requirement in May 2016. FIFA Ends Indonesia's Suspension from Football after Almost a
Year, BBC SPORT FOOTBALL (May 14, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/sport/football/36292992.
Moreover, in the spring of 2016, FIFA forced Greece to reinstate the Greek Cup (which had
been suspended by the Greek government over issues of match fixing and fan violence) and
to accept a normalization committee to avoid suspension from FIFA. See Graham Wood,
Greece given 10 Days to Reverse Cup Cancellation or Face FIFA Suspension, REUTERS
SPORTS
NEWS
(Apr.
5,
2016),
http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-soccer-greeceidUKKCN0X221L; Agreement between Greece, FIFA to Avoid Suspension of Greek Clubs,
AGENCIA EFE (May 12, 2016), http://www.efe.com/efe/english/sports/agreement-betweengreece-fifa-to-avoid-suspension-of-greek-clubs/50000266-2894504;
148 FIFA, supra note 6 art. 19.
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government involvement is simply to remove corrupt officials or to
improve public enjoyment of sport.

